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Background: Intrusive reexperiencing in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is commonly triggered by
stimuli with perceptual similarity to those present during the trauma. Information processing theories
suggest that perceptual processing during the trauma and enhanced perceptual priming contribute to
the easy triggering of intrusive memories by these cues.
Methods: Healthy volunteers (N ¼ 51) watched neutral and trauma picture stories on a computer screen.
Neutral objects that were unrelated to the content of the stories brieﬂy appeared in the interval between
the pictures. Dissociation and data-driven processing (as indicators of perceptual processing) and state
anxiety during the stories were assessed with self-report questionnaires. After ﬁller tasks, participants
completed a blurred object identiﬁcation task to assess priming and a recognition memory task. Intrusive
memories were assessed with telephone interviews 2 weeks and 3 months later.
Results: Neutral objects were more strongly primed if they occurred in the context of trauma stories than
if they occurred during neutral stories, although the effect size was only moderate ðhp2 ¼ :08Þ and only
signiﬁcant when trauma stories were presented ﬁrst. Regardless of story order, enhanced perceptual
priming predicted intrusive memories at 2-week follow-up (N ¼ 51), but not at 3 months (n ¼ 40). Data-
driven processing, dissociation and anxiety increases during the trauma stories also predicted intrusive
memories. Enhanced perceptual priming and data-driven processing were associated with lower verbal
intelligence.
Limitations: It is unclear to what extent these ﬁndings generalize to real-life traumatic events and
whether they are speciﬁc to negative emotional events.
Conclusions: The results provide some support for the role of perceptual processing and perceptual
priming in reexperiencing symptoms.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Intrusive memories are considered the hallmark symptom of
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). They commonly consist of
relatively brief sensory impressions from the trauma (Hackmann,
Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999; Van
der Kolk & Fisler, 1995), that are experienced as happening in the
“here and now” rather than being a memory from the past
(Hackmann et al., 2004; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005),
and are easily triggered by a wide range of internal and external
cues (Southwick et al., 1993; Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). Intrusivetal Psychology, University of
þ44 1865 618600; fax: þ44
s).
 license.memories and their triggers can include those that bear no
meaningful relationship with the traumatic event but are only
temporally associated (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 2002;
Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007). The present
experiment investigated two related processes that may be
involved in the easy triggering of intrusive memories, perceptual
processing during the trauma and perceptual priming.1.1. Perceptual priming
Priming is a type of implicit memory that is characterized by
enhanced identiﬁcation of previously seen stimuli (Schacter, 1992).
Ehlers and Clark (2000) proposed that the easy triggering of
intrusive memories by perceptually similar stimuli is, in part,
a function of strong perceptual priming. They suggested that trauma
survivors who acquire strong priming for stimuli that they
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threshold for these stimuli. This makes it more likely that they
detect potential triggers of intrusive memories in their
environment.
There is preliminary evidence for a role of perceptual priming in
PTSD. Several studies found that after encoding trauma-related and
neutral material, people with PTSD show greater perceptual
priming for trauma-related material compared to controls inword-
stem completion or perceptual identiﬁcation tasks (e.g., Amir,
Leiner, & Bomyea, 2010; Ehring & Ehlers, 2011; Michael, Ehlers, &
Halligan, 2005). Priming predicted PTSD severity 6 months later
(Ehring & Ehlers, 2011; Michael, Ehlers, & Halligan, 2005). Kleim,
Ehring, and Ehlers (2012) further found that trauma survivors
with PTSD show perceptual processing advantages in identifying
blurred trauma-related pictures compared to those without PTSD.
Experimental analogue studies provided initial support for the
role of perceptual priming in the development of intrusive trauma
memories (Arntz, de Groot, & Kindt, 2005; Ehlers, Mauchnik, &
Handley, in press; Ehlers, Michael, Chen, Payne, & Shan, 2006;
Michael & Ehlers, 2007). For example, a paradigm developed by
Ehlers et al. (2006) investigates priming for neutral objects that are
perceived just before something “traumatic” happens. Participants
watch a series of “traumatic” and neutral picture stories, each
comprising three pictures. The content of the ﬁrst picture is neutral,
introduces the main character of the story, and contains neutral
objects for which priming was later measured. The plot then
unfolds in the second picture either in a traumatic or in a neutral
way. The last picture depicts the outcome of the story. With this
paradigm, neutral stimuli that preceded a “traumatic” event
showed enhanced perceptual priming and predicted intrusive
memories (Ehlers et al., 2006; Michael & Ehlers, 2007).
1.2. Perceptual processing during trauma
Information processing models of PTSD suggest that strong
encoding of perceptual information and relatively weak encoding
of contextual information during trauma predicts subsequent
reexperiencing symptoms (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996;
Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
Two related ways of processing that may facilitate strong encoding
of perceptual information have been investigated in PTSD; (i) data-
driven processing (Roediger, 1990) refers to encoding that focuses
on the surface level features of a situation (i.e., sensory details such
as colours and shapes) rather than its meaning (Ehlers & Clark,
2000), and (ii) dissociation is a complex concept involving a lack
of integration of subjective experiences including depersonaliza-
tion, derealization, altered time perception and emotional numbing
(e.g., Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). It has been suggested that
dissociation during trauma may in part predict PTSD because, like
data-driven processing, it leads to preferential encoding of
perceptual information (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). It has further been
suggested that dissociation during a traumatic event decreases
focal attention, thereby interfering with meaningful processing of
the traumatic event and promoting a nonverbal, perceptual pro-
cessing style (Brewin et al., 1996; Siegel, 1995).
Clinical and analogue studies found that data-driven processing
and dissociation predict later reexperiencing and PTSD (e.g., Ehring,
Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2008; Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers,
2003; Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004). It is not yet clear by
which mechanisms these forms of processing during the trauma
contribute to PTSD. One possible pathway is perceptual priming
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000) which is thought to rely heavily on percep-
tual operations and unconscious processes and should therefore
beneﬁt from encoding styles that favour perceptual information
(Roediger, 1990). In line with this hypothesis, data-drivenprocessing and dissociation correlated with priming in clinical and
analogue studies (Ehlers et al., 2006; Lyttle, Dorahy, Hanna, &
Huntjens, 2010; Michael & Ehlers, 2007).
1.3. Aims of the study
A new version of Ehlers et al.’s (2006) paradigm to investigate
perceptual priming for objects from traumatic contexts and its
relationship with processing styles and intrusions was developed
to address some limitations of the earlier paradigm. First, the
number of primed neutral objects was increased. Second, objects
were no longer presented within the slides of the picture stories,
but interspersed in the intervals between story pictures so that they
could be counterbalanced across trauma and neutral stories.
The study investigated the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Neutral stimuli are more strongly primed if they
occur in a traumatic context than if they occur in a neutral context.
Hypothesis 2. Enhanced perceptual priming for objects previ-
ously seen in a traumatic context predicts subsequent intrusive
memories.
Hypothesis 3. Data-driven processing and state dissociation
during traumatic stories predict subsequent intrusive memories.
Hypothesis 4. Data-driven processing and state dissociation
predict enhanced perceptual priming for trauma-related stimuli.
In addition, we assessed recognition memory for objects
previously seen in traumatic and neutral contexts to check the
possible inﬂuence of explicit memory on priming effects. On the
basis of previous results with a similar paradigm (Ehlers et al.,
2006; Michael & Ehlers, 2007), we did not expect an inﬂuence of
story context on recognition memory. We also assessed state
anxiety and verbal intelligence to explore their relationship with
priming and intrusive memories.2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
Fifty-six healthy volunteers were recruited from a database of
people interested in participating in research. Potential participants
were excluded if they had a history of past trauma (n ¼ 0), were
currentlysuffering fromdepressionorblood/injuryphobia (n¼0),had
previous experience with related psychological experiments (n ¼ 3)
and/or had frequent previous exposure to distressing visual stimuli
(e.g., professional background involving exposure to dead bodies or
photosofmutilatedbodies,n¼2). Thus, theﬁnal sample comprised51
participants (27 male). Ages ranged from 18 to 68 years (M ¼ 30.6;
SD¼ 11.4). All participants completed theﬁrst follow-up interviewat2
weeks after the experiment (100%); and 41 (80%) participated in the
second follow-up interview after 3 months. Participants received £15
as reimbursement for their time and travel expenses.
2.2. Experimental paradigms
The experiment was programmed with SuperLab 4.0 (Cedrus
Corp, San Pedro, CA, USA). Picture stories and memory tests were
presented on a 1700 Dell monitor using a Dell Optiplex PC (GX 270).
2.2.1. Picture stories
Participantswatched two trauma and two neutral picture stories
comprising eight pictures on a computer screen, and listened to
a narrative of what was happening in the story. Presentation mode
was adapted from Cahill, Prins, Weber, and McGaugh (1994) and
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the narrative started 3 s into the picture. Table 1 shows the structure
of the stories. A total of four different trauma stories and parallel
neutral stories were constructed for the experiment. The parallel
neutral stories started with the same 3 pictures as the respective
trauma story to introduce themain characters, and then unfolded in
a neutral way over the remaining 5 pictures.
Participants were informed that the purpose of the experiment
was to study emotional effects of picture stories andwere instructed
towatch thepictures closelyand imagine that theywere anobserver
present at the scene. Neutral and trauma stories were matched in
terms of number of people in the stories and gender of characters.
Each participant saw two trauma stories and the two neutral
stories that were parallel to the remaining trauma stories. To
minimize mood carry-over effects between stories, trauma and
neutral stories were presented blockwise and separated by a 10-
min break during which participants completed questionnaires.
Trauma and neutral story blocks were counter-balanced across
participants. Furthermore, within blocks, the order of the two
picture stories was counter-balanced.
2.2.2. Interspersed objects
In the interval between the pictures of the picture stories, after
1 s of a blank screen, photos of neutral objects (e.g., spirit level,
onion) that were unrelated to the content of the story brieﬂy
appeared on the computer screen for 2 s. These neutral objects
were of main interest to the experiment because priming and
recognition memory for these objects was later measured. Partici-
pants were instructed that some other pictures would occur in
between the snapshots of the story, that these were unrelated to
the story and that they did not need to take any notice of them but
instead should focus on the story.
There were two parallel sets of 14 neutral objects that were
selected in pilot studies (see Section 2.2.4). Object sets were
counter-balanced across the trauma and neutral stories. Further-
more, the position of objects within the stories was counter-
balanced with a Latin Square design so that across participants
each object occurred in each position during the stories.
2.2.3. Memory tests
Two forms of memory for the interspersed objects were
assessed, perceptual priming and recognition memory.
2.2.3.1. Perceptual priming task. Perceptual priming was assessed
with a blurred object identiﬁcation task. Blurred pictures of the 28
objects previously shown in the picture stories and 28 new
(unprimed) objects were presented in random order. The partici-
pants’ task was to identify and name the objects as quickly and as
precisely as possible. Participants were not informed that the testTable 1
Structure of picture stories: example of one trauma story and parallel neutral story.
Part of story Picture Trauma story
Neutral introduction
(identical for trauma
and neutral story)
1 “George Miller” lies
reading a book
2 George works at hi
presentation
3 George stays up lat
Main part, content either
traumatic or neutral
4 Burglar breaks into
5 Masked man appea
holding a knife
6 George’s throat is c
7 Ambulance rushes
but George dies
8 George’s funeralwas an implicit memory test. They were told that this was a new
and unrelated task that aimed to assess how easily blurred pictures
can be identiﬁed. Answers were tape-recorded and written down
and later scored for accuracy. The dependent measure was the rate
of correct identiﬁcation. For correlational analyses, an enhanced
perceptual priming scorewas computed as EPP¼ identiﬁcation rate
(objects previously seen in traumatic context) minus identiﬁcation
rate (objects previously seen in neutral context), signifying the
enhanced priming linked to traumatic contexts.
2.2.3.2. Object recognition task. Recognition memory for the
interspersed objects was assessed with an object recognition task.
This task was incorporated into the study to assess the possible
inﬂuence of explicit memory processes on the priming measure
and intrusive memories. Participants were shown the original
(unblurred) objects that had been interspersed into the picture
stories and new control objects for 2 s in random order. The
participants’ task was to indicate for each object whether or not
they had seen it within the picture stories.
Scoring of the object recognition test followed signal detection
theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). From the hits (original
objects correctly identiﬁed as “old”) and false alarms (objects
erroneously identiﬁed as “old”), sensitivity (d0) and response bias
(c) scores were calculated. Sensitivity indicates how well partici-
pants discriminated between objects from the picture stories and
“new” parallel objects, d0 ¼ probit (hits)  probit (false alarms).
Response bias. a measure of leniency in endorsing an object as
“old”, is calculated as c¼.5* (probit (hits)þ probit (false alarms)).
2.2.4. Pilot studies of stimulus material
Three pilot studies were conducted to assess the suitability of
the newly developed stimulus material.
2.2.4.1. Pilot study 1: baseline identiﬁcation rates of blurred objects.
The aim of the ﬁrst pilot study (N ¼ 34) was to adjust baseline
identiﬁcation rates of the blurred objects to a degreewhich allowed
approximately 40e50% correct identiﬁcation of the objects without
prior encoding. On the basis of the responses of the ﬁrst 14 partic-
ipants, blurredness was systematically adjusted with a Gaussian
ﬁlter (Adobe Photoshop, Version 9.0) using a radius between 8 and
15 pixels. All objects were sized between 190 and 300  181e240
pixels. The remaining 20 participants provided the baseline iden-
tiﬁcation rates for the two picture sets of objects (A and B) were as
follows. Set A:M¼ .41, SD¼ .10; Set B:M¼ .41, SD¼ .10; t(19)¼ .33,
p ¼ .75, hp2 ¼ :00.
2.2.4.2. Pilot study 2: identiﬁcation rates when encoded without
emotional context. To ensure that objects from both picture sets
were not only similar in baseline identiﬁcation rates, but also inNeutral story
in bed with his wife, “George Miller” lies in bed with his wife,
reading a book
s desk preparing a George works at his desk preparing a
presentation
e, working George stays up late, working
the house George has breakfast
rs in front of George, George leaves the house
ut, bleeding badly Journey to work, lots of trafﬁc
George to the hospital, At ofﬁce, George talks with colleagues
George gives his presentation
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of the two sets of blurred objects following prior encoding without
any (emotional) context. The unblurred objects were presented in
random successive order. After a distraction phase (unrelated visual
ﬁller tasks), the neutral objects were presented again, this time
blurred, and participants had to identify them as quickly and
precisely as possible. There were no differences in identiﬁcation
rates between the sets: Set A: M ¼ .60, SD ¼ .11; Set B: M ¼ .60,
SD¼ .11; t(19)¼.81, p¼ .429, hp2 ¼ :00. Hence, possible memory
differences for the interspersed objects reported in this study can be
attributed to the emotional nature of the picture stories.
2.2.4.3. Pilot study 3: suitability of picture stories. Participants
(N ¼ 27) rated each story on scales from 10 to þ10 in terms of
pleasantness (extremely unpleasant to very pleasant) and activation
(very relaxing to very activating). Traumatic stories were perceived
as more activating (M ¼ 5.0, SD ¼ 3.1 vs. M ¼ 7.9, SD ¼ 1.4; F
(1,26) ¼ 68.4, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :74) and more unpleasant (M ¼ 3.0,
SD¼ 2.8 vs.M¼ 4.9, SD¼ 2.6; F (1, 26)¼ 303.5, p< .001, hp2 ¼ :93)
than neutral stories. No differences between trauma and neutral
stories were found in the participants’ reported ability to keep their
mind focused on the stories (M¼ 8.8, SD¼ 1.0 vs.M¼ 8.4, SD¼ 1.5;
F(1, 26) ¼ 3.5, p ¼ .08, hp2 ¼ :13) and to imagine being an observer
at the scene of the story (M¼ 7.3, SD ¼ 1.9 vs.M¼ 7.2, SD¼ 2.2; F(1,
26) ¼ .2, p ¼ .68, hp2 ¼ :01), each on scales from 0 not at all to 10
very much. Furthermore, participants engaged signiﬁcantly more in
data-driven processing during traumatic picture stories than in
neutral stories on a scale from 0 to 4 (M ¼ 0.9, SD ¼ 0.5 vs.M ¼ 0.7,
SD ¼ 0.4; F(1, 26) ¼ 8.8, p ¼ .007, hp2 ¼ :28).
2.3. Self-report measures
2.3.1. Manipulation checks
After each picture story, participants rated the story on scales
from 10 to þ10 in terms of pleasantness (extremely unpleasant to
very pleasant) and activation (very relaxing to very activating, e.g.,
pounding heart, tense muscles).
After the priming task, a short interview assessed whether
participants noticed that some blurred objects had earlier occurred
in the picture stories, and if so, whether they tried to actively recall
the objects during the blurred picture task.
2.3.2. Data-driven processing and dissociation questionnaires
The 8-item Data-driven Processing Scale (DDPS, Halligan, Clark, &
Ehlers, 2002) assessed processing of perceptual features of the
picture stories (e.g., “It was like a stream of unconnected impressions
following each other”). The 9-item State Dissociation Questionnaire
(SDQ, Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002) assessed different aspects of
dissociation (e.g., “I felt distant from my emotions”). Items on both
scales were rated from 0 not at all to 4 very much, and the total score
was the mean of all items. Previous studies showed satisfactory to
good psychometric properties for both scales (internal consisten-
cies above .70; convergent validity with related measures above
.50), and discriminated between participants with and without
PTSD symptoms in traumatized and non-traumatized samples (e.g.,
Ehring et al., 2008; Halligan et al., 2002; 2003; Murray et al., 2002).
Internal consistencies of the DDPS and the SDQ in the present
sample were a¼ .71 and a¼ .73 for trauma stories, and a¼ .45 and
a¼ .55 for neutral stories (the latter was low due to ﬂoor effects for
neutral stories).
2.3.3. State trait anxiety inventory (STAI)
The state version of the STAI (Spielberger, 1983), a widely used
standardized measure of state anxiety was given at baseline and
after each block of picture stories. The difference between baselineand post trauma-block scores indexed the anxiety response to the
trauma stories.
2.3.4. Intrusion interview
Intrusive memories of the traumatic picture stories were
assessed by telephone interview 2 weeks and 3 months after the
experiment. Participants were asked whether any unwanted
images from the picture stories had popped into their mind during
the last week and if so, to describe their content (e.g., a spontane-
ously occurring mental image of the child that featured in one
story). Overall frequency of intrusive memories was rated on a scale
from 0 to 7 (never, once, twice, three to four times, about every other
day, nearly every day, more often than once a day). Distress for each
intrusive memory was assessed on a scale from 0 not at all dis-
tressing to 10 very much distressing.
2.3.5. National adult reading test (NART)
After the picture stories, participants completed theNART (Nelson
& Willison, 1982), a measure of verbal intelligence that requires
participants to read out aloud a list of 50 irregularly spelt words. The
number ofwordspronounced correctly comprises theﬁnal score. The
NARTcorrelateshighlywithothermeasuresof intelligenceandallows
the prediction of full-scale IQ scores (Blair & Spreen, 1989).
2.4. Procedure
The study was approved by the local ethics committee. On
arrival at the laboratory participants gave written consent. They
then ﬁlled in the STAI and provided information about demo-
graphics, and past experiences with traumatic events, similar
experiments or distressing visual material. Afterwards the ﬁrst
block of the picture stories (trauma or neutral) was shown, fol-
lowed by a 10-min break when participants completed the DDPS,
SDQ and STAI. The investigator conversed with the participant
about unrelated matters until the 10 min were over. After presen-
tation of the second block of picture stories (trauma or neutral),
participants completed the DDPS, SDQ, and STAI again, followed by
the NART and two other ﬁller tasks. The perceptual priming task,
manipulation check interview and object recognition task followed.
Afterwards the experimenter explained further steps of the study
and reimbursed the participant. The investigator conﬁrmed that
the participant felt well and encouraged them to get in contact in
case they felt distressed about the experiment. However, none of
the participants took up this offer. The Intrusion Interview was
conducted on the telephone 2 weeks and 3 months later.
2.5. Data analysis
Statistical analyses were performed with SPSS version 19. We
report two-tailed levels of signiﬁcance; values of p < .05 were
considered signiﬁcant. The main analyses were repeated measures
analyses of variance (ANOVA), with story context (trauma vs.
neutral) as the within-subject factor. Following Rosenthal (1995),
effect sizes were computed as hp2, which reﬂects the proportion of
total variability attributable to a factor when all other factors are
taken into account. Effects of :01 < hp2 < :0588 are considered
small, :0588  hp2  :1379 medium and hp2  :1379 large (Cohen,
1988, p. 283).
3. Results
3.1. Validity of the picture stories
As expected and in line with pilot study 3, participants
perceived trauma stories as signiﬁcantly more unpleasant
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hp
2 ¼ :89) and activating (M¼ 3.6, SD¼ 3.7 vs.M¼4.2, SD¼ 3.7;
F(1, 50) ¼ 175.8, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :78) than neutral stories. In
addition, participants reported signiﬁcantly greater state anxiety
during traumatic picture stories, M ¼ 35.9, SD ¼ 9.2, compared to
neutral stories, M ¼ 29.3, SD ¼ 7.8; F(1, 50) ¼ 17.1, p < .001,
hp
2 ¼ :31, and baseline, M ¼ 30.4, SD ¼ 6.4; F(1, 50) ¼ 22.56,
p < .001, whereas state anxiety during neutral stories did not differ
from baseline, F(1, 46) ¼ 1.53, p ¼ .22.
Participants engaged signiﬁcantly more in data-driven pro-
cessing (M ¼ 0.9, SD ¼ 0.6 vs. M ¼ 0.6, SD ¼ 0.4; F(1,50) ¼ 9.4,
p ¼ .004, hp2 ¼ :16) and state dissociation (M ¼ 0.3, SD ¼ 0.4 vs.
M ¼ 0.1, SD ¼ 0.2; F(1,50) ¼ 10.4, p ¼ .002, hp2 ¼ :18) during
trauma stories than during neutral stories.
3.2. Perceptual priming task
3.2.1. General priming effect
To check for a general priming effect, a repeated measures
ANOVA compared identiﬁcation rates for all objects that partici-
pants had previously seen interspersed into the picture stories with
those for new objects. Primed objects were more readily identiﬁed,
M ¼ .60, SD ¼ .14, than unprimed objects, M ¼ .40, SD ¼ .15, F(1,
50) ¼ 101.0, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :70.
3.2.2. Effects of trauma context on priming (Hypothesis 1)
Table 2 shows the effects of story context on object identiﬁca-
tion in the blurred picture task. In line with Hypothesis 1, objects
previously seen in the context of trauma stories were identiﬁed
with greater probability than objects previously seen in the context
of neutral stories.
3.2.2.1. Further analyses. Twenty-six participants (51%) reported
having tried to actively recall the objects during the priming task;
identiﬁcation rates active recall: Mtrauma ¼ .66, SDtrauma ¼ .15;
Mneutral ¼ .65, SDneutral ¼ .13; no active recall: Mtrauma ¼ .60,
SDtrauma ¼ .18; Mneutral ¼ .52, SDneutral ¼ .14. A 2  2 ANOVA with
story context (trauma vs. neutral) as the within factor and active
recall (yes vs. no) as the between factor, showed a main effect for
active recall, F(1, 49) ¼ 6.41, p ¼ .015, hp2 ¼ :12, indicating that
participants who used the active recall strategy had signiﬁcantly
higher identiﬁcation rates than those who did not. Further, there
was a trend for an interaction Story Context  Active Recall, F(1,
49) ¼ 2.61, p ¼ .113, hp2 ¼ :05. Bonferroni-controlled post-hoc
analyses revealed that participants who did not actively recall the
objects identiﬁed objects from trauma stories signiﬁcantly more
often than objects from neutral stories, F(1, 49) ¼ 6.9, p ¼ .011,
hp
2 ¼ :12, whereas no signiﬁcant difference was found in the
active-recall group, F(1, 49) ¼ .15, p ¼ .703, hp2 ¼ :00. Therefore,
active recall was controlled for in the following analyses where
appropriate.
To test whether order of story block inﬂuenced identiﬁcation
rates, a mixed 2  2 ANOVA with order (trauma stories vs. neutral
stories presented ﬁrst) as the between factor and story context
(trauma vs. neutral) as the within factor and was computed. There
was no main effect for order, F(1, 49) ¼ .005, p ¼ .946, hp2 ¼ :00;Table 2
Results of priming and recognition tests.
Memory task Picture stories Statistic
Trauma Neutral F(1,50) p hp2
Priming task Identiﬁcation score .63 (.16) .58 (.15) 4.40 .042 .080
Recognition task Sensitivity (d0) 1.40 (.96) 1.50 (1.01) .74 .395 .014
Response bias (c) .03 (.51) .05 (.47) .11 .740 .002but the main effect of story context, F(1, 49) ¼ 5.46, p ¼ .047,
hp
2 ¼ :078, was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant Order  Story Context
interaction, F(1, 49) ¼ 5.46, p ¼ .024, hp2 ¼ :10. Post hoc analyses
revealed that the EPP effect was only signiﬁcant for participants
who saw the trauma stories ﬁrst, F(1,49) ¼ 10.16, p ¼ .001,
hp
2 ¼ :17; and could not be demonstrated for those who saw the
neutral stories ﬁrst, F(1,49) ¼ .042, p ¼ . 838, hp2 ¼ :00. Therefore,
order of story block was controlled in the following analyses where
appropriate.
3.3. Recognition task
Table 2 shows the results of the object recognition task. As ex-
pected, there were no main effects or interactions of story context
for sensitivity of discrimination (d0) or response bias (c). Equally
there were no differences in hits (both 70%) or false alarm rates
(25e27%) for the two story contexts. Additional analyses found no
main effects or interactions for order of story block.
3.4. Predictors of intrusive memories
At 2 weeks 10 participants (19.6% of 51) reported intrusive
memories of images from the picture stories in the preceding week
with mean distress ratings ofM¼ 5.7, SD ¼ 2.4, range¼ 2e9; mean
intrusion frequencyM ¼ .43, SD ¼ .99, range ¼ 0e4. At 3 months, 5
participants (12.5% of 40) reported intrusions with mean distress
ratings ofM¼ 5.5, SD¼ 1.9, range¼ 4e8: mean intrusion frequency
M ¼ .5, SD ¼ 1.45, range ¼ 0e7. In addition, a few participants re-
ported intrusions of the interspersed neutral objects, but these
were not included in the correlational analyses as these may have
been inﬂuenced by the twomemory tests (Krans, Näring, Holmes, &
Becker, 2009). In accordance with Hypothesis 2, EPP predicted
intrusive memories in the second week after the experiment,
r ¼ .29, p ¼ .04. This relationship remained signiﬁcant when
controlling for order of story block, r ¼ .29, p ¼ .04 (trauma stories
ﬁrst, r ¼ .32; neutral stories ﬁrst, r ¼ .30), and active recall, r ¼ .29,
p ¼ .04. However, EPP did not predict intrusions at 3 months,
r ¼ .02, p ¼ .91, n ¼ 40.
As expected, recognition sensitivity (d0) for objects from trauma
stories did not correlate with intrusive memories reported at 2
weeks, r ¼ .05, p ¼ .710. There was a trend for a negative rela-
tionship with intrusions at 3 months, r ¼ .28, p ¼ .076.
In line with Hypothesis 3, both data-driven processing, r ¼ .33,
p ¼ .018, and state dissociation during trauma stories, r ¼ .53,
p < .001, predicted the frequency of intrusive memories in the
second week after the experiment. Data-driven processing and
dissociation no longer signiﬁcantly predicted intrusive memories at
3 months (r’s < .21, p’s > .20). Increases in state anxiety with the
trauma stories also predicted intrusive memories at 2 weeks,
r ¼ .36, p ¼ .012, but not at 3 months, r ¼ .07, p ¼ .68. There were
no signiﬁcant correlations with intelligence.
A multiple regression analysis tested the relative contribution of
EPP, recognition sensitivity, data-driven processing and dissocia-
tion, pleasantness and arousal ratings, anxiety response, and verbal
intelligence (NART) to the prediction of intrusive memories at 2
weeks. The predictors were entered simultaneously and explained
40.6% of the variance, R¼ .637, F(8, 45)¼ 3.16, p¼ .008. EPP, b¼ .30,
p ¼ .041, explained unique variance; there was a trend for intelli-
gence, b ¼ .24, p ¼ .098, but no unique effects of anxiety, b ¼ .24,
p¼ .124, arousal b¼.22, p¼ .157, pleasantness, b¼.113, p¼ .457,
and recognition sensitivity, b ¼ .01, p ¼ .942. Data-driven pro-
cessing, b¼ .247, p¼ .181, and dissociation, b¼ .249, p¼ .177, which
are conceptually related measures, correlated substantially, r ¼ .59,
and did not explain unique variance when they were both entered
together into the multiple regression. When they were entered
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the other predictors, data-driven processing, b¼ .374, p ¼ .023, and
dissociation, b ¼ .374, p ¼ .023.
3.5. Predictors of enhanced perceptual priming
In contrast to Hypothesis 4, EPP did not correlate with self-
reported data-driven processing, r ¼ .03, p ¼ .836, nor with
state dissociation, r ¼ .19, p ¼ .182. Controlling for order of story
block and active recall did not affect these relationships. Other
reactions during the trauma stories, including increases in state
anxiety, perceived arousal and pleasantness did not correlate with
EPP either (see Table 3). The only variable that predicted EPP was
lower verbal intelligence as measured by the NART, r ¼ .30,
p ¼ .034. Lower intelligence also correlated with data-driven pro-
cessing, r ¼ .31, p ¼ .027.
4. Discussion
This analogue study supports the role of both perceptual pro-
cessing during exposure to traumatic material and enhanced
perceptual priming for stimuli perceived in a traumatic context in
subsequent intrusive memories.
4.1. Enhanced perceptual priming in traumatic contexts
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, neutral objects were more
strongly primed if participants saw them in the context of trau-
matic picture stories than if they saw the same objects in the
context of neutral stories. In accordance with Hypothesis 2, EPP for
objects seen in traumatic contexts predicted intrusive memories 2
weeks after the experiment. Although EPP effect sizes were only in
the moderate range ðhp2 ¼ :08Þ and inﬂuenced by order effects,
the ﬁndings replicate and extend earlier ﬁndings demonstrating
the effects of traumatic contexts on perceptual priming and its
relationship with subsequent intrusive memories (Ehlers et al., in
press; Ehlers et al., 2006; Michael & Ehlers, 2007). The novel
paradigm used in the present study allowed us to demonstrate the
EPP more unambiguously than in the previous studies as the
objects for which primingwasmeasuredwere no longer embedded
within the stories and could therefore be counterbalanced across
story contexts. The results underline clinical observations that
trauma triggers and intrusive memories may include stimuli that
do not have a meaningful relationship with the trauma and are
merely linked to the trauma by temporal association (e.g., Ehlers
et al., 2002).
There has been a debate in the literature on the inﬂuence of
explicit memory processes on the performance of implicit memory
tasks, such as the perceptual priming test employed in this study
(Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993). The current study was not
designed to address this issue, but the pattern of ﬁndings suggestsTable 3
Correlations between variables in multiple regression analysis.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Intrusions at 2 weeks .29* .05 .33* .53*** .36* .05 .28 .03
2. Enhanced Priming .14 .03 .19 .04 .05 .06 .30*
3. Recognition sensitivity .20 .13 .15 .05 .12 .02
4. Data-driven processing .59*** .30* .29* .40** .31*
5. Dissociation .44** .24 .42** .20
6. Anxiety .45** .31* .06
7. Arousal .38** .14
8. Pleasantness .16
9. Verbal Intelligence
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.that the EPP effect and its relationship with subsequent intrusions
was not mediated by explicit memory. Story context did not affect
recognition performance in the object recognition task, and
participants did not exhibit a differential response bias for the
stories. This makes it unlikely that the EPP effect stems from
explicit memory processes. Secondly, participants who used active
recall strategies during the blurred picture task showed a reduced
EPP effect (i.e., a smaller difference between objects from trauma
and neutral stories), suggesting that active recall masked the EPP
effect. The priming test results for participants who used active
recall resemble those for the recognition memory test. If the EPP
effect was due to explicit memory processes, one would have ex-
pected enhancement of EPP with active recall. Furthermore,
recognition sensitivity was not related to intrusions at 2 weeks and
even tended to be negatively related to intrusions at 3 months.
Since strong explicit memory indicates better elaboration
(Baddeley, 1997), this ﬁnding is in accordance with Ehlers and
Clark’s (2000) proposal that elaboration enhances higher-order
meaning-based retrieval strategies and at the same time inhibits
direct triggering of intrusive memories (see also the effects of
experimentally-induced elaboration, Ehlers et al., in press; Michael
& Ehlers, 2007).
EPP did not predict intrusive memories at 3 months. The choice
of this time point may not have been ideal as the trauma stories
used in this study were only a weak stressor and may not be dis-
tressing enough to induce long-lasting intrusions. Very few
participants reported intrusions at 3 months. Thus, this result may
indicate a ﬂoor effect. Furthermore, the sample was reduced by 3
months, which resulted in low power. Alternatively, the results may
also indicate post-experiment conceptual processing of the stim-
ulus material that may have led to a decrease in the EPP effect over
time (Ehlers et al., in press; Michael & Ehlers, 2007). It is also
conceivable that the recognition test may have contributed to an
overall reduction in intrusive memories (Krans et al., 2009).
So far, it remains unclear what factors underlie the observed EPP
effect for trauma-related stimuli. The results are in line with other
studies showing that task relevance can inﬂuence perceptual
priming (Holbrook, Bost, & Cave, 2003), suggesting that priming
may not just be an automatic consequence of perception but may
reﬂect a more adaptive and ﬂexible mechanism for the modiﬁca-
tion of perceptual processing. Therefore, it can be speculated that
EPP for trauma-related cuesmay be an adaptive response that helps
the individual to identify similar cues and thus avoid potentially
dangerous situations in the future (Ehlers et al., 2002). This
proposed function of EPP is similar to that of fear conditioning
which is considered to be essential for survival, as it helps identify
reliable predictors of signiﬁcant events and the triggering of
preparatory responses (Davey, 1987; Dawson & Schell, 1987).
Although EPP and fear conditioning serve adaptive purposes they
may come at cost when their inappropriate activation increases the
probability that harmless cues in the environment trigger reex-
periencing symptoms in the aftermath of a trauma (Ehlers et al.,
2006).
4.2. Perceptual processing during the traumatic picture stories
In line with Hypothesis 3, data-driven processing and dissocia-
tion predicted intrusive memories at 2 weeks. Effect sizes were
small, but in line with previous studies (e.g., Halligan et al., 2003;
Holmes et al., 2004; Murray et al., 2002). In interpreting the effect
sizes, one has to bear in mind that trauma stories were only
moderately aversive and means for data-driven processing and
dissociation were low. Both data-driven processing and dissocia-
tion (when considered individually) contributed unique variance to
the prediction of intrusive memories that was not explained by the
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way people process traumatic material affects the probability of
subsequent reexperiencing symptoms beyond what is explained by
high levels of emotion. Data-driven processing and dissociation
have in common that they lead to preferential encoding of
perceptual information, which may facilitate the subsequent trig-
gering of intrusivememories bymatching perceptual cues (Ehlers &
Clark, 2000). Correlations were no longer signiﬁcant at 3 months,
probably due to ﬂoor effects and the restricted range of perceptual
processing.
In contrast to Hypothesis 4, data-driven processing and disso-
ciation during the picture stories did not correlate with EPP. Several
possible explanations are conceivable. First, self-reports may only
be imprecise assessments of perceptual processes as they rely on
introspection and individuals may differ in their ability to
consciously access such complex cognitive processes. Second,
objects were shown before picture-onsets to allow for counter-
balancing within and across picture stories. However, this meth-
odological advantage might have come at a cost to the precision of
assessing processing of the objects for which priming was later
measured. It is conceivable that the self-reports reﬂected percep-
tual processing during the trauma pictures, but not during the
presentation of the objects. Third, theoretical assumptions about
priming as the pathway by which perceptual processing leads to
intrusions might not be correct. An alternative pathway might be
a poorly elaborated trauma memory (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). More
research is needed to examine the causal relationship between
cognitive processes and priming.
Interestingly, both data-driven processing and EPP were pre-
dicted by low verbal intelligence. Low verbal intelligence is one of
the risk factors for PTSD (McNally & Shin, 1995). Ehlers and Clark
(2000) speculated that low intelligence may increase the risk for
PTSD by reduced conceptual and enhanced perceptual processing
during trauma. The current ﬁndings are in linewith this hypothesis.
4.3. Limitations
The present study had limitations. Firstly, the study employed
an analogue design and the extent to which results generalize to
real-life trauma and PTSD reexperiencing remains unclear. Never-
theless, analogue designs are generally seen as a suitable way to
induce and investigate mechanisms underlying intrusive reexper-
iencing (Ehring, Kleim, & Ehlers, 2011; Holmes & Bourne, 2008).
Second, the overall number of intrusive memories was low. This
may reﬂect the fact that participants found the stories only
moderately distressing. Furthermore, we measured intrusions
during the past week retrospectively over the phone, thus possibly
underestimating their frequency. A phone interview was chosen
over a diary to ensure participants understood the distinction
between intrusive memories and intentionally retrieved memories
and that the intrusions were about images from the stories rather
than other aspects of the experiment. Thirdly, error variance was
increased by an effect of order of story block. Participants who ﬁrst
watched trauma stories exhibited a signiﬁcant EPP effect, whereas
participants who ﬁrst watched the neutral stories did not show this
effect. This problem might have arisen because the current study
did not familiarize participants with the paradigm by using
a practice story. Participants may therefore have processed the ﬁrst
picture story and its interspersed neutral objects differently from
the following stories. Although participants were instructed to
focus on the stories and “not to take special notice” of the inter-
spersed objects, it is conceivable that they paid more attention to
these objects in the ﬁrst block of stories than in the second block.
Strength of priming has been found to be greatest for those items
that receive the most attention (Stankiewicz, Hummel, & Cooper,1998), which may explain the signiﬁcant interaction between
‘order of story block’ and story context. Future studies should
address this problem by using a practice story. Fourth, the assess-
ment of perceptual processing was limited to self-reports, and it
would be of interest to include objective measures of attention to
perceptual and conceptual aspects of the stimulus material.
Finally, although great care was taken in matching the picture
story conditions in many respects, the comparison of neutral and
trauma stories did not allow us to investigate the speciﬁcity of EPP
to trauma stories. Future studies should investigate whether EPP
also occurs in equally arousing but non-aversive contexts, or
equally negative but non-arousing contexts. However, the speci-
ﬁcity of the EPP effect is not of theoretical relevance to the model of
intrusive trauma memories investigated here (Ehlers & Clark,
2000), as this model does not claim speciﬁcity. It is conceivable
that EPP may be a mechanisms involved in triggering unintentional
memories of emotional events in general.
4.4. Conclusions and future directions
The results support the role of perceptual processing and
perceptual priming in reexperiencing symptoms. They are in line
with information processing models of PTSD that emphasize strong
encoding of perceptual information and relatively weak encoding
of contextual information during trauma as risk factors for subse-
quent reexperiencing symptoms (Brewin et al., 2010; Ehlers &
Clark, 2000). Further studies are needed to clarify the role of
perceptual priming and perceptual processing in the development
of intrusive memories after trauma. Avenues to build on the current
ﬁndings may be to employ more sensitive measures of visual
priming such as reaction times, use of more distressing stimuli or
clinical populations, and manipulations of cognitive processing to
generate more direct experimental evidence on hypothesized
relationships between processing styles, priming and intrusions
(see Holmes et al., 2004; Kindt, Van den Hout, Arntz, & Drost, 2008;
Stuart, Holmes, & Brewin, 2006). Finally, clinical observations show
that intrusions often reﬂect stimuli that signalled the onset of the
trauma or of its worst moments (Ehlers et al., 2002; Hackmann
et al., 2004). Interestingly, some participants reported that they
had intrusive memories of the interspersed objects rather than the
picture stories themselves. Therefore, it would be of interest to
systematically measure intrusions from the unrelated interspersed
neutral objects in future studies.
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